嘉    宾：邓尚律 助理教授 澳门大学

主持人：陆卓然 助理教授 金沙威尼斯欢乐娱人城

时    间：2024年12月4日（周三）14:00-15:30

地    点:  金沙威尼斯欢乐娱人城徐汇校区金沙威尼斯欢乐娱人城A511

内容简介：

Recurring auctions are ubiquitous for selling durable assets like artworks and homes, with follow-up auctions held for unsold items. We investigate such auctions theoretically and empirically. Theoretical analysis demonstrates that recurring auctions outperform single-round auctions when buyers face entry costs, enhancing efficiency and revenue due to sorted entry of potential buyers. Optimal reserve price sequences are characterized. Empirical findings from home foreclosure auctions in China reveal significant annual gains in efficiency (3.40 billion USD, 16.60%) and revenue (2.97 billion USD, 15.92%) using recurring auctions compared to single-round auctions. Implementing optimal reserve prices can further improve efficiency (3.35%) and revenue (3.06%).

演讲人简介：

Shanglyu Deng is an Assistant Professor of Economics in the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Macau. He earned his Ph.D. in economics from the University of Maryland and obtained his master’s and bachelor’s degrees from Peking University. His research interests include Applied Microeconomic Theory and Industrial Organization. Currently, his research focuses on auction theory, market design, contest theory, and dynamic competition. His papers have been published in the Journal of Economic Theory, Theoretical Economics, the Journal of Mathematical Economics, and Economics Letters.